Abstract. In this paper we study the link between formal and cryptographic models for security protocols in the presence of a passive adversary. In contrast to other works, we do not consider a fixed set of primitives but aim at results for an arbitrary equational theory. We define a framework for comparing a cryptographic implementation and its idealization w.r.t. various security notions. In particular, we concentrate on the computational soundness of static equivalence, a standard tool in cryptographic pi calculi. We present a soundness criterion, which for many theories is not only sufficient but also necessary. Finally, we establish new soundness results for the Exclusive Or, as well as a theory of ciphers and lists.
Introduction
Today's ubiquity of computer networks increases the need for theoretic foundations for cryptographic protocols. For more than twenty years now, two communities separately developed two families of models. Both views have been very useful in increasing the understanding and quality of security protocol design. On the one hand formal or logical models have been developed, based on the seminal work of Dolev and Yao [12] . These models view cryptographic operations in a rather abstract and idealized way. On the other hand cryptographic or computational models [13] are closer to implementations: cryptographic operations are modeled as algorithms manipulating bit-strings. Those models cover a large class of attacks, namely all those implementable by a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine.
The advantage of formal models is that security proofs are generally simpler and suitable for automatic procedures, even for complex protocols [10, 9, 1] . Unfortunately, the high degree of abstraction and the limited adversary power raise serious questions regarding the security offered by such proofs. Potentially, justifying symbolic proofs with respect to standard computational models has tremendous benefits: protocols can be analyzed using automated tools and still benefit from the security guarantees of the computational model.
Recently, a significant research effort has been directed at linking the two approaches. One of the first result is presented by Abadi and Rogaway [5] : they prove the computational soundness of formal (symmetric) encryption in the case a passive attacker. Since then, many results [7, 6, 14, 15] have been obtained. In particular, Backes et al. [7, 6] prove the soundness of a rich language including digital signatures, public-key and symmetric key encryption in the presence of an active attacker. Laud [14] presents an automated procedure for computationally sound proofs of confidentiality in the case of an active attacker and symmetric encryption when the number of sessions is bounded.
Each of these results considers a fixed set of primitives, e.g. symmetric or publickey encryption. In this paper, we aim at presenting general results for arbitrary equational theories, such as encryption, but also less studied ones, e.g. groups or exclusive or. We concentrate on static equivalence, a notion of indistinguishability common in cryptographic pi calculi [4, 3] . Intuitively, static equivalence asks whether an attacker can distinguish between two tuples of terms, by exhibiting an equation which holds on one tuple but not on the other. This provides an elegant mean to express security properties against passive attackers. Moreover there exist exact [2] and approximate [11] algorithms to decide static equivalence for a large family of equational theories.
Our first contribution is a general framework for comparing formal and computational models in the presence of a passive attacker. We define the notions of soundness and faithfulness of a cryptographic implementation w.r.t. equality, static equivalence and deducibility. Soundness holds when each formal proof has a computational interpretation. Faithfulness is the converse, i.e. the formal model does not provide false attacks.
Our second contribution is a sufficient criterion for soundness w.r.t static equivalence: intuitively the usual computational semantics of terms has to be indistinguishable to an idealized one. We also provide a general definition of patterns for arbitrary equational theories that encompasses the notion usually defined for symmetric and public encryption. Those patterns allow us to characterize a large class of theories for which our soundness criterion is necessary.
Our third contribution consists in applying our framework to obtain two novel soundness results. The first theory deals with the Exclusive Or. Interestingly, our proof reflects the unconditional security (in the information-theoretic sense) of the One-Time Pad encryption scheme. Second we consider a theory of symmetric encryption and lists. In some sense, the result is similar to the one of Abadi and Rogaway [5] . However, we consider deterministic, length-preserving, symmetric encryption schemes a.k.a. ciphers. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result on such schemes, whose specificity is that decryption always succeeds.
Outline of the paper. In the next section, we introduce our abstract and concrete models together with the notions of indistinguishability. We then define the notions of soundness and faithfulness and illustrate some consequences of soundness w.r.t. static equivalence on groups. In Section 4, we define the ideal semantics of abstract terms, present our soundness criterion and also show that for a large family of interesting equational theories, the soundness criterion is a necessary condition. As an illustration (Section 5), we prove the soundness for the theories modeling Exclusive Or, as well as ciphers and lists. We then conclude and give directions for future work.
Modeling cryptographic primitives with abstract algebras
In this section we introduce some notations and set our abstract and concrete models.
Abstract algebras
Our abstract models-which we call abstract algebras-consist of term algebras defined on a first-order signature with sorts and equipped with equational theories.
Specifically a signature (S, F) is made of a set of sorts S = {s, s 1 . . .} and a set of symbols F = {f, f 1 . . .} together with arities of the form ar(f ) = s 1 × . . . × s k → s, k ≥ 0. Symbols that take k = 0 arguments are called constants; their arity is simply written s. We fix an infinite set of names N = {a, b . . .} and an infinite set of variables X = {x, y . . .}. We assume that names and variables are given with sorts. The set of terms of sort s is defined inductively by
where for the last case, we further require that T i is a term of some sort s i and ar(f ) = s 1 × . . . × s k → s. As usual, we write var(T ) and names(T ) for the set of variables and names occurring in T respectively. A term is ground or closed iff it has no variables.
Substitutions are written σ = {x 1 = T 1 , . . . , x n = T n } with dom(σ) = {x 1 , . . . , x n }. We only consider well-sorted substitutions, that is substitutions σ = {x 1 = T 1 , . . . , x n = T n } for which x i and T i have the same sort. σ is closed iff all of the T i are closed. We extend the notation names(.) from terms to substitutions in the obvious way. The application of a substitution σ to a term T is written σ(T ) = T σ.
Symbols in F are intended to model cryptographic primitives, whereas names in N are used to model nonces i.e. concretely random numbers. The abstract semantics of symbols is described by an equational theory E, that is an equivalence relation (also written = E ) which is stable by application of contexts and well-sorted substitutions of variables. We further require that E is stable by substitution of names. All the equational theories that we consider in this paper satisfy these properties. For instance, symmetric and deterministic encryption is modeled by the theory E enc generated by the classical equation E enc = {dec(enc(x, y), y) = x}.
Frames, deducibility and static equivalence
Following [3, 2] , a frame is an expression ϕ = νã.σ whereã is a set of bound (or restricted) names and σ is a well-sorted substitution. Intuitively, frames represent sequences of messages learned by an attacker during the execution of a protocol.
For simplicity we only consider frames νã.σ which restrict every names occurring in σ, that isã = names(σ). In other words, names a must be disclosed explicitly by adding a mapping x a = a to the substitution. Thus we tend to assimilate frames and their underlying substitutions.
A term T is deducible from a closed frame ϕ, written ϕ E T iff there exists a term M with var(M ) ⊆ dom(ϕ) and names(M ) ∩ (names(ϕ) ∪ names(T )) = ∅ such that M ϕ = E T . Consider for instance the theory E enc and the frame
Deducibility is not always sufficient to account for the knowledge of an attacker. E.g. it lacks partial information on secrets. This is why the notion of static equivalence is used. Two closed frames ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 are statically equivalent, written ϕ 1 ≈ E ϕ 2 , iff (i) dom(ϕ 1 ) = dom(ϕ 2 ), (ii) for all terms M, N with variables included in dom(ϕ i ) and using no names occurring in
For instance, the two frames νk. {x = enc(0, k)} and νk. {x = enc(1, k)} are statically equivalent with respect to E enc , whereas the two frames νk. {x = enc(0, k), y = k} and νk, k .{x = enc(0, k ), y = k} are not.
Concrete semantics
We now give terms and frames a concrete semantics, parameterized by an implementation of the primitives. Provided a set of sorts S and a set of symbols F as above, a (S, F)-computational algebra A consists of -a non-empty set of bit-strings Assume a fixed (S, F)-computational algebra A. We associate to each closed frame
A , of which the drawings ψ ← ψ are computed as follows:
1. for each name a appearing in T 1 , . . . , T n , draw a value a Notice that when a term or a frame contains no names, the translation is deterministic; in this case, we use the same notation to denote the distribution and its unique value.
(Families of) distributions over concrete frames benefit from the usual notion of cryptographic indistinguishability. Let us note η ≥ 0 the complexity parameter. Two families (ψ η ) and (ψ η ) of distributions over concrete frames are indistinguishable, written (ψ η ) ≈ (ψ η ), iff for every probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, intuitively A cannot guess whether he is given a sample from ψ η or ψ η with a probability significantly greater than 1 2 . Rigorously, we ask that the advantage of A,
is a negligible function of η, that is, remains eventually smaller than any η −n (n > 0) as η tends to infinity.
Relating abstract and computational algebras
In the previous section we have defined abstract and computational algebras. We now relate formal notions such as equality, (non-)deducibility and static equivalence to their computational counterparts, i.e. equality, one-wayness and indistinguishability.
Soundness and faithfulness
We introduce the notions of sound, resp. faithful, computational algebras with respect to the formal relations studied here: equality, static equivalence and deducibility. In the remaining of the paper we only consider families of computational algebras (A η ) such that for any sort s, the probability of collisions of two random elements in
Specifically a family of computational algebras (A η ) is -= E -sound iff for every closed terms T 1 , T 2 of the same sort,
Aη ; e 1 = Aη e 2 is negligible; -= E -faithful iff for every closed terms T 1 , T 2 of the same sort,
Aη ; e 1 = Aη e 2 is negligible; -≈ E -sound iff for every closed frames ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 of the same domain,
implies that there exists a polynomial-time adversary A for distinguishing concrete frames, such that 1 − Adv
is negligible; -E -sound iff for every closed ϕ and T , ϕ E T implies that for all polynomial-time adversary A, P φ, e ← [[ϕ, T ]] Aη ; A(φ) = Aη e is negligible; -E -faithful iff for every closed ϕ and T , ϕ E T implies that there exists a polynomial-time adversary A such that
Sometimes, it is possible to prove stronger notions of soundness that hold without restriction on the computational power of adversaries. In particular, (A η ) is unconditionally = E -sound iff for every closed terms T 1 , T 2 of the same sort,
Aη ; e 1 = Aη e 2 = 1; unconditionally ≈ E -sound iff for every closed frames ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 of the same domain,
; unconditionally E -sound iff for every closed ϕ and T s.t. ϕ E T , the distributions for ϕ and T are independent: for all φ 0 , e 0 ,
Generally, (unconditional) = E -soundness is given by construction. Indeed true formal equations correspond to the expected behavior of primitives and should hold in the concrete world with overwhelming probability. The other criteria are however more difficult to fulfill. Therefore it is often interesting to restrict frames to well-formed ones in order to achieve soundness or faithfulness: for instance Abadi and Rogaway [5] do forbid encryption cycles (c.f. Section 5.2).
It is worth noting that the notions of soundness and faithfulness introduced above are not independent.
The proof is given in Appendix A.1. For many interesting theories, we have that ≈ Esoundness implies all the other notions of soundness and faithfulness. This emphasizes the importance of ≈ E -soundness and provides an additional motivation for its study. As an illustration, let us consider an arbitrary theory which includes keyed hash functions. The proof (Appendix A.2) is done by encoding the different problems with ≈ E and h s .
≈ E -soundness implies classical assumptions on groups
In this section we present some interesting consequences of ≈ E -soundness. Inspired by the work of Rivest on pseudo-freeness [17] , we show that several standard cryptographic assumptions are a direct consequence of the soundness of a theory representing groups. Let E G be the equational theory modeling a free group G with exponents taken over a free commutative ring A. (Precise sets of symbols and equations are detailed in Appendix B.)
We now introduce several classical problems on groups, which in cryptography are considered to be hard, i.e. not feasible by any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary:
-discrete logarithm (DL) problem: given g and g , find a, such that g a = g ; -computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem: given g, g a and g b , find g ab ; -decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem: given g, g a and g b , distinguish g ab from a random element g c ; -RSA problem: given elements a and g a , find g.
Suppose that there is a family of computational algebras (A η ) which are ≈ E Gsound. Then no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A can solve the DDH problem with non-negligible probability. Indeed consider the two frames
The question of distinguishing these two frames encodes exactly the DDH problem. Given the equational theory E G , ϕ 1 ≈ E G ϕ 2 . As we suppose ≈ E G -soundness, we have that the concrete semantics of those two frames cannot be distinguished, i.e.
Hence, A cannot solve the DDH problem. Clearly, if one can solve the DL problem, one can also solve the CDH problem, which itself allows us to solve the DDH problem. Therefore, the hardness of DDH implies the hardness of the two other problems.
In a similar way we show that ≈ E G -soundness implies the hardness of RSA. Instead of directly encoding the RSA problem, we introduce a slightly weaker decision problem, whose hardness implies the hardness of RSA. The encoding of this problem requires the extension of the signature by a one-way function h : G → G, adding no equation to the theory. Consider the two frames ϕ1 = νg, a.{x1 = g a , x2 = a, x3 = h(g)} and ϕ2 = νg, g , a.{x1 = g a , x2 = a, x3 = g }.
We have that ϕ 1 ≈ E G ϕ 2 . As above, if we suppose ≈ E G -soundness of (A η ), we have that the RSA problem cannot be solved by a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary. An interesting open question is whether ≈ E G -soundness implies or is implied by Rivest's notion of pseudo-free groups [17] . We conjecture that the two notions are in fact incomparable. Indeed, on the one hand, our notion implies the hardness of DDH, which remains an open question for pseudo-free groups. On the other hand pseudofreeness deals with a form of adaptive attackers while our model is purely non-adaptive.
A sufficient (and often necessary) criterion for ≈ E -soundness
We now present useful results for proving ≈ E -soundness properties in general. Notably, we provide a sufficient criterion for ≈ E -soundness in Section 4.1 and prove it necessary under additional assumptions in Section 4.2.
Ideal semantics and ≈ E -soundness criterion
Given an implementation of the primitives, what we called the concrete semantics maps every closed frame ϕ to a distribution [[ϕ] ] Aη in the expected way. We now define the ideal semantics of a ϕ, intuitively as the uniform distribution over sequences of bitstrings (in the appropriate space) that pass all the formal tests verified by ϕ.
Given a closed frame ϕ, let us write eq E (ϕ) for the set of tests that are true in ϕ:
We say that (A η ) has uniform distributions iff for every η and every sort s,
Aη is a finite set, = Aη,s is the usual equality and the distribution associated to s by A η is the uniform one over
Definition 1 (Ideal semantics).
Let (A η ) be an unconditionally = E -sound family of computational algebras, having uniform distributions. Let ϕ = {x 1 = t 1 , . . . , x n = t n } be a closed frame and s i the sort of
ideal Aη of ϕ is the uniform distribution over the finite (non-empty) set of concrete frames:
For instance, let ϕ = νn 1 , n 2 .{x 1 = n 1 , x 2 = n 2 } with n 1 and n 2 of sort s. Then
A more general definition of the ideal semantics, which does not restrict (A η ) to have only uniform distributions is given in Appendix C.
We can now state our ≈ E -soundness criterion: intuitively, the two semantics, concrete and ideal, should be indistinguishable.
Theorem 1 (≈ E -soundness criterion)
. Let (A η ) be an unconditionally = E -sound family of computational algebras. Assume that for every closed frame ϕ it holds that
As eq E (ϕ 1 ) = eq E (ϕ 2 ), for every η, by construction, the distri-
ideal Aη are equal. We use transitivity of the indistinguishability relation ≈ to conclude:
Patterns revisited
Patterns have been introduced by Abadi and Rogaway [5] and used in subsequent work [15, 8] as a way to define computationally sound formal equivalences. Typically frames are mapped to patterns by replacing non-deducible subterms by boxes . Two frames are then equivalent iff they yield the same pattern (up to renaming of names). For example, the pattern associated to the frame
In this section we propose a general, novel definition of patterns and study some of their properties. We then use these properties to prove that our soundness criterion is necessary in many cases.
Definition 2 (Pattern). A closed frame ϕ is a pattern if each of its subterms is deducible from ϕ.
Equivalently a pattern is a closed frame of the form ϕ = {x 1 = C 1 [a 1 , . . . , a m ], . . . , x n = C n [a 1 , . . . , a m ]}, where the C 1 . . . C n are public (non necessarily linear) contexts and the a 1 . . . a m are distinct deducible names: ϕ E a i . For example, the frame ϕ 1 considered above is not a pattern while
The following proposition finitely characterizes the equations verified by a pattern.
Proposition 3. Let ϕ be a pattern. For each
a i , let ζ ai be a public term such that var(ζ ai ) ⊆ {x 1 , . . . , x n } and ζ ai ϕ = E a i .
Then every equation which holds in ϕ is a logical consequence (in the first-order theory of equality) of E and the equations
Interestingly the concrete and the ideal semantics of patterns often coincide. The idea of the proof (detailed in Appendix D.2) is that, using the finite characterization of eq E (ϕ) (Proposition 3), one can draw a bijection between the drawing of nonces and the eligible values for the ideal semantics.
A theory E admits patterns iff for every closed frame ϕ, there exists a (not necessarily unique) pattern ϕ such that ϕ ≈ E ϕ. In practice many theories useful in cryptography satisfy this property, e.g. the theories considered in Section 5. Note that we have proved en passant that ≈ E is decidable for equational theories that admit patterns and for which = E is decidable, provided the construction of patterns is effective. Indeed, given two frames ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 , we associate to each of them static equivalent patterns ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 . It is then straightforward to check whether ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 are equivalent using the finite characterization of eq E (ϕ i ) by Proposition 3.
The following theorem states that our soundness criterion is actually very tight: whenever a theory admits patterns, our criterion is a necessary condition. 
ideal Aη ).
Examples
We now apply the framework of Sections 3 and 4 to establish two novel ≈ E -soundness results, concerning the theory of Exclusive Or and that of ciphers and lists.
Exclusive Or
We study the soundness and faithfulness problems for the usual theory and implementation of the Exclusive Or (XOR).
The formal model consists of a single sort Data, an infinite number of names, the infix symbol ⊕ : Data × Data → Data and two constants 0, 1 : Data. Terms are equipped with the equational theory E ⊕ generated by:
As an implementation, we define the computational algebras A η , η ≥ 0:
η equipped with the uniform distribution; ⊕ is interpreted by the usual XOR function over {0,
In this setting, statically equivalent frames enjoy an algebraic characterization. Indeed, let ϕ and ϕ be two frames with names(ϕ) ∪ names(ϕ ) ⊆ {a 1 , . . . , a n } and dom(ϕ) = dom(ϕ ) = {x 1 , . . . , x m }. We associate to ϕ a (m + 1) × (n + 1)-matrix α = (α i,j ) over the two element field F 2 : the 0-th row of α is (1, 0 . . . 0) and for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n (resp. j = 0) α i,j is the number of occurrences of a j (resp. of 1) in ϕ(x i ), modulo 2. In the same way, a matrix α is associated to ϕ . Using classical manipulations on matrix, it is easy to show that ϕ ≈ E⊕ ϕ iff coker(α) = coker(α ), where coker(α) denotes the co-kernel of α (i.e. the set of rows β s.t. β · α = 0).
This characterization is the key point of our main result for the theory of XOR.
Theorem 3. The usual implementation for the XOR theory is unconditionally
The proof is detailed in Appendix E. We show that the concrete and ideal semantics coincide using the duality property im(α) = coker(α) ⊥ . This result is comparable to the work of Bana [8] , who shows the unconditional soundness of the One-Time Pad encryption in a setting similar to that of Abadi and Rogaway [5] . In some sense our result is more precise as we model the XOR symbol itself and not a particular use of it.
Symmetric, deterministic, length-preserving encryption and lists
We now detail the example of symmetric, deterministic and length-preserving encryption schemes. Such schemes, also known as ciphers [16] , are widely used in practice, the most famous examples being DES and AES .
Our formal model consists of the set of sorts S = {Data, List 0 , List 1 . . . List n . . .}, an infinite number of names for each sort and the symbols:
We consider the equational theory E sym generated by (for every n ≥ 0)
When oriented from left to right, the equations E sym form an (infinite) convergent rewriting system, written R. The concrete meaning of sorts and symbols is given by the computational algebras A η , η > 0, defined as follows:
nη equipped with the uniform distribution and the usual equality relation; -enc n , dec n are implemented by a cipher for data of size nη and keys of size η (we discuss the required cryptographic assumptions later);
Aη returns the η first digits of bit-strings (of size (n + 1)η) whereas [[tail n ]] Aη returns the last nη digits.
We emphasize that no tags are added to messages. Tags-and in particular tags under encryption-would be harmful to the ≈ Esym -soundness. Indeed we expect that the formal equivalence νa, b.{x = enc(a, b), y = b} ≈ Esym νa, b, c.{x = enc(a, b), y = c} also holds in the computational world; but this will not be the case if a is tagged before encryption.
For simplicity we assume that the encryption keys have the same size η as blocks of data. This is not a real restriction since smaller keys can always be padded with random digits and the additional digits ignored by the encryption algorithm. We also assume that keys are generated according to a uniform distribution. (This is the case for AES, and also for DES if we restrict keys to their 56 significant bits.) Obviously, the above implementation is unconditionally = Esym -sound. Before studying the ≈ Esym -soundness, we need to characterize statically equivalent frames. Specifically we show that this theory admits patterns, in the sense of Section 3.
Proposition 5. Let
ϕ be a closed frame. There exists a pattern ϕ such that ϕ ≈ Esym ϕ.
Proof (outline).
We associate a pattern to any frame ϕ by the following procedure:
1. normalize ϕ using the rules R (the result is still denoted ϕ); 2. while ϕ is not a pattern, repeat: find any subterm T of the form T = enc n (U, V ),
, with ϕ Esym V and replace T everywhere in ϕ by a fresh name a of the appropriate sort.
We prove in Appendix F.1 that this procedure always terminates on a pattern statically equivalent to the initial frame.
Notice that for any subterm W , ϕ Esym W implies ϕ{T → n} Esym W {T → n}, where {T → n} denotes the replacement of T by n. As a consequence, the procedure above yields a unique pattern (modulo renaming), no matter in what order the subterms T are replaced.
Provided that Esym is decidable, the procedure for associating patterns to frame is effective. Thus, as noticed in Section 4.2, we obtain another proof of the decidability of ≈ Esym using Proposition 3. Notice that statically equivalent patterns may not be equal modulo renaming: consider e.g. {x = enc(a, b), y = b} ≈ Esym {x = c, y = b}.
We now study the ≈ Esym -soundness problem under realistic cryptographic assumptions. Classical assumptions on ciphers include the notions of super pseudo-random permutation (SPRP) and indistinguishability against lunchtime or adaptive, chosenplaintext or chosen-ciphertext attacks (written IND-Pi-Cj, i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2} depending on the different combinations). These notions and the relations between them have been studied notably in [16] .
Initially, the SPRP and IND-Pi-Cj assumptions apply to ciphers specialized to plaintexts of a given size. Interestingly, this is not sufficient to imply the ≈ Esym -soundness for frames which contain plaintexts of heterogeneous sizes, encrypted under the same key. Thus we introduce strengthened versions of these assumptions, applying to a collection of ciphers (E η,n , D η,n ), where η is the complexity parameter and n ≥ 0 is the number of blocks of size η contained in plaintexts and ciphertexts.
We define the ω-IND-Pi-Cj assumption i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2}, by considering the following experience G -first a key k is randomly chosen from {0, 1} η ; -(Stage 1) A 1 is given access-if i ≥ 1-to the encryption oracles E η,n (·, k), andif j ≥ 1-to the decryption oracles D η,n (·, k). A 1 outputs two plaintexts m 0 , m 1 ∈ {0, 1} n0η for some n 0 , and possibly some data d; -(Stage 2) a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} is drawn. A 2 receives the challenge ciphertext c = E η,n0 (m b , k), the data d and is given access-if i ≥ 2-to the encryption oracles E η,n (·, k), and-if j ≥ 2-to the decryption oracles D η,n (·, k). A 2 then outputs a bit b ; -A is successful in G η iff b = b and, during the two stages, it has not submitted m 0 or m 1 to an encryption oracle, nor c to a decryption oracle.
Define the advantage of A as: Adv
The usual IND-Pi-Cj assumption corresponds to the case where n is restricted to the value 1 in the above definition. A similar strengthening of the SPRP assumption, written ω-SPRP, is proposed in Appendix F.2.
As in previous work [5, 15, 6, 14] , we restrict frames to those with only atomic keys and no encryption cycles. Specifically a closed frame ϕ has only atomic keys if for all subterms enc n (u, v) and dec n (u, v) of ϕ, v is a name. Given two (atomic) keys k 1 and k 2 , we say that k 1 encrypts k 2 in ϕ, written k 1 > ϕ k 2 , iff there exists a subterm U of ϕ of the form U = enc n (T, k 1 ) or U = dec n (T, k 1 ) such that k 2 appears in T not used as a key, i.e. k 2 appears in T at a position which is not the right-hand argument of a enc n or a dec n . An encryption cycle is a tuple
The effect of the condition "not used as a key" is to allow considering more terms as free of encryption cycles, for instance enc n (enc n (a, k), k). This improvement is already suggested in [5] .
We now state our ≈ Esym -soundness theorem. A closed frame is well-formed iff its R-normal form has only atomic keys, contains no encryption cycles and uses no head and tail symbols.
Theorem 4 (≈ Esym -soundness). Let ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 be two well-formed frames of the same domain. Assume that the concrete implementations for the encryption and its inverse satisfy both the
The proof is detailed in Appendix F.3. The idea is to prove the computational soundness of each step of the procedure for mapping frames to patterns (Proposition 5). We conclude using Proposition 4 on the ideal semantics for patterns.
Note on the cryptographic assumptions. Cryptographic assumptions of Theorem 4 may appear strong compared to existing work on passive adversaries [5, 15] . This seems unavoidable when we allow frames to contain both encryption and decryption symbols. Nevertheless if ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 contain no decryption symbols, our proofs are easily adapted to work when the encryption scheme is ω-IND-P1-C0 only.
Also, it is possible to recover the classical assumptions IND-Pi-Cj by modeling the ECB mode (Electronic Code Book). Let us add two symbols enc : Data × Data → Data and dec : Data ×Data → Data, and define the symbols enc n and dec n (formally and concretely) recursively by enc n+1 (x, y) = cons n (enc(head n (x), y), enc n (tail n (x), y)) and dec n+1 (x, y) = cons n (dec(head n (x), y), dec n (tail n (x), y)).
Define well-formed frames as those of which the normal forms contain no encryption cycles. The ≈ Esym -soundness property for well-formed frames holds as soon as the implementations for enc and dec are both IND-P1-C1, or equivalently [16] enc is SPRP.
Conclusion and future work
In this paper we developed a general framework for relating formal and computational models of security protocols in the presence of a passive attacker. These are the first results on abstract models allowing arbitrary equational theories. We define the soundness and faithfulness of cryptographic implementations w.r.t. abstract models. We also provide a soundness criterion which for a large number of theories-those that admit a general notion of patterns-is not only sufficient but also necessary. Finally, we provide new soundness results for the Exclusive Or, as well as a theory of ciphers and lists.
As future work, we foresee to study the soundness of other theories. An interesting case would be the combination of the two theories considered in this paper: in a theory combining XOR, ciphers and lists, one can precisely model cipher block chaining commonly used with ciphers such as DES or AES. Another ambitious extension is to consider the case of an active attacker.
A Soundness and faithfulness
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1 Proposition 1. Let (A η ) be a = E -sound family of computational algebras. Then
Proof.
Suppose ϕ E T i.e. there exists M such that M ϕ = E T and var(M ) ⊆ dom(ϕ)
and the names of M do not occur neither in ϕ nor in T . We define the adversary A which can deduce Proof.
1. Let T 1 , T 2 be two terms of sort s such that T 1 = E T 2 . Consider the frame ϕ = {x 1 = h s (T 1 , k), x 2 = h s (T 2 , k)} where k is a fresh name of sort Key. As T 1 = E T 2 formally and h s has no equations, we have ϕ ≈ E {x 1 = n, x 2 = n } where n, n are two distinct fresh names of sort Hash. Thus by hypothesis:
. The probability for the two names to be equal concretely is negligible, thus
is negligible. 2. Let ϕ be a frame and T a term of sort s. We let ϕ 1 = ϕ∪{x = h s (T, k), y = k} and ϕ 2 = ϕ ∪ {x = n, y = k} where x, y are fresh variables, k is a fresh name of sort Key, n is a fresh name of sort Hash. 3 . Let T 1 , T 2 be two terms of sort s such that T 1 = E T 2 . Consider the same frame as before: ϕ = {x 1 = h s (T 1 , k), x 2 = h s (T 2 , k)}. As T 1 = E T 2 formally and h s has no equations, we have ϕ ≈ E {x 1 = n, x 2 = n} where n is a fresh name of sort Hash. Thus by hypothesis: 
B An abstract model of groups
We model a group G with exponents taken over a commutative ring A and define the following symbols:
As usual, we use infix notation to denote the operators * , ·, + and write g a to denote exp(g, a) . Consider the following equational theory E G :
Abelian groups are modeled by adding the equations x * y = y * x and (x * y) a = x a * y a . By unconditional = E -soundness, the drawings φ which are (= Aη -equivalent to values) in the image of the usual semantics of ϕ always pass the test of step 2. As we required that the drawing from |T i | Aη gives no = Aη -equivalent class a zero probability, the probability to succeed at each step 2 is thus greater than zero. Hence the loop "eventually" terminates and the definition makes sense. (Rigorously,
C Ideal semantics Definition 3 (Ideal semantics, general case). Let (A η ) be a family of unconditionally = E -sound computational algebras and ϕ
ideal Aη is a conditional distribution.)
As eq E (ϕ) is likely to be infinite, the definition may not be effective; this has no consequence here. Recent work of Abadi and Cortier [2] and results of Section 4 suggest that eq E (ϕ) can be described finitely in a way that makes this definition effective, for many equational theories E.
D Patterns

D.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3. Let ϕ be a pattern. For each a i , let ζ ai be a public term such that var(ζ ai ) ⊆ {x 1 , . . . , x n } and ζ ai ϕ = E a i . Then every equation which holds in ϕ is a logical consequence of E and the equations x j = C j [ζ a1 , . . . , ζ am ], i.e.
By logical consequence, we mean that the equations are deducible from the hypotheses in the first-order theory of equality.
. Since E is stable by substitution of names, we get:
Using the equalities x j = C j [ζ a1 , . . . , ζ am ] and by transitivity, we obtain
D.2 Proof of Proposition 4 Proposition 4. Let (A η ) be an unconditionally = E -sound family of computational algebras having only uniform distributions. Let ϕ be a pattern. The concrete and the ideal semantics of ϕ yield the same family of distributions: for all
Proof. Let ϕ = {x 1 = C 1 [a 1 , . . . , a m ] , . . . , x n = C n [a 1 , . . . , a m ]}, with ϕζ i = E a i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m as above. Let s i be the sort of a i , s j be the sort of x j , , and η a given complexity parameter.
For simplicity let us fix the order of variables x 1 , . . . , x n and see concrete frames merely as tuples of bit-strings. The concrete values for ϕ are then taken from the set:
More precisely, the usual concrete semantics consists in mapping every drawing of names from the set
Aη to a value in F . Let us note α : E → F this function, defined by:
Using the ζ i , we can also define a function β : F → E:
As ϕζ i = E a i and (A η ) is unconditionally = E -sound (and the distribution over E forgets no element), we have by construction: β • α = Id E . Thus α is injective and yields a bijection from E to its image G = α(E). Moreover G satisfies:
As ϕ is a pattern, by Proposition 3, eq E (ϕ) is implied by the equations C j [ζ 1 , . . . , ζ m ] = x j and E. By hypothesis equations in E are true in the concrete world with probability 1, thus G is precisely the set of values that pass all the tests in eq E (ϕ). Now recall that, by hypothesis, E and F are equipped with uniform distributions. Hence the concrete and the ideal semantics yield the same distribution for ϕ and A η , that is the uniform distribution over G.
E Soundness and faithfulness results for the theory of XOR
To begin with, let us detail the algebraic characterization of ≈ E⊕ . We use the last two equations as a rewriting system
where we allow arbitrary AC-manipulations before (and after) each rewriting step. It is easy to show that this rewriting system is (AC-)convergent i.e. each term yields a unique (modulo AC) normal form. Specifically, a term T is in normal form iff each name or variable occurs at most once in T and either T = 0 or 0 does not occur in T . Let a 1 . . . a n be distinct names. Using the equations of XOR, each closed term T with names(T ) ⊆ {a 1 . . . a n } can be written: T = E⊕ β 0 ⊕ n j=1 β j a j where β j ∈ {0, 1} and we use the convention 0a i = 0 and 1a i = a i . In the following, we see {0, 1} as the two-element field F 2 ; thus terms modulo = E⊕ form a F 2 -vector space.
Similarly a closed frame ϕ with names(ϕ) ⊆ {a 1 . . . a n } is written
where α i,j ∈ F 2 . Let us group the coefficients into a (m+1)×(n+1)-matrix α = (α i,j ) over F 2 . ϕ is described by the relation:
We now characterize the set eq E⊕ (ϕ) of equations valid in ϕ. Let M, N be such
Therefore we only study the case where N = 0.
Assume M in normal form. M ϕ = E⊕ 0 and names(M ) ∩ names(ϕ) = ∅ implies
that is, (β 0 . . . β m ) belongs to the co-kernel of α, noted coker(α).
Finally let ϕ and ϕ be two closed frames with names(ϕ)∪names(ϕ ) ⊆ {a 1 . . . a n } and dom(ϕ) = dom(ϕ ) = {x 1 . . . x m }. Let α and α be the two corresponding (m + 1) × (n + 1)-matrices defined as above. From the previous discussion, we deduce that:
ϕ ≈ E⊕ ϕ iff coker(α) = coker(α ) Theorem 3. The usual implementation for the XOR theory is unconditionally = E⊕ -, ≈ E⊕ -and E⊕ -sound. It is also = E⊕ -, ≈ E⊕ -and E⊕ -faithful.
Proof (of Theorem 3).
The unconditional = E⊕ -soundness is clear, hence the E⊕ -faithfulness (Proposition 1).
Let T = 0 a closed term in normal form. The semantics of T is either the constant
] Aη = 0 is negligible. Hence the = E⊕ -faithfulness holds and by proposition 1, so does the ≈ E⊕ -faithfulness.
We use the ideal semantics to address the unconditional ≈ E⊕ -soundness. Indeed we shall prove that: for any frame ϕ,
ideal Aη ). The result will follow from the proof of Theorem 1.
Let ϕ be a frame, and α = (α i,j ) its (m + 1) × (n + 1)-matrix associated as before. Let us see α as a F 2 -linear function from (F 2 ) n+1 to (F 2 ) m+1 . The usual concrete semantics of ϕ consists in drawing a random vector from (F 2 ) (n+1)η for the value of names, and then applying a F 2 -linear function α : (
, the initial distribution over (F 2 ) (n+1)η is the uniform distribution over the affine space A = (1
nη made of vectors of which the first block is 1 η . (This first constant block is only a convenience for dealing with the constant term.) The function α is defined by
On the other hand, the ideal semantics of ϕ consists in drawing a random vector from the subset F of (
whose elements satisfy all the equations in eq E⊕ (ϕ) and have 1 η as first block. (Again the first block is not present in the real bit-strings.) From the previous discussion, F is written
mη . Now let us change the basis of (F 2 ) (n+1)η and see it as
, that is: we regroup the i-th bit of each block. Then α is simply the product application:
then F is simply the product of all values that are orthogonal to coker(α), restricted to B:
Thus F is in fact the image of A by α.
As α is linear, it transforms uniform distributions over affine spaces into uniform distributions. Therefore the ideal and the concrete semantics yield both the uniform distribution over F . Hence the unconditional ≈ E⊕ -soundness.
We now prove the unconditional E⊕ -soundness. Let ϕ be a frame and T a term, both in normal form, with names(ϕ) ∪ names(T ) = {a 1 . . . a n }. Let α associated to ϕ as before and T = E⊕ β 0 ⊕ n j=1 β j a j . Suppose that ϕ E⊕ T , that is there exists ζ with names(ζ) ∩ {a 1 . . . a n } = ∅, such that ζϕ = E⊕ T i.e. ζϕ ⊕ T = E⊕ 0. Assume ζ in AC-normal form. As previously, ζϕ ⊕ T = E⊕ 0 implies names(ζ) ⊆ {a 1 . . . a n }, hence names(ζ) = ∅. Therefore ζ computes nothing but a linear transformation on the rows of α. We deduce that ϕ E⊕ T holds iff (β 0 . . . β m ) belongs to the co-image of α, written coim(α).
Now assume that ϕ E⊕ T i.e. β = (β 0 . . . β n ) ∈ coim(α). Let γ be the (m + 2) × (n + 1)-matrix obtained by augmenting α with a (m + 1)-th row equal to β:
We know that the concrete semantics of ϕ and T is nothing but the uniform distribution over the image of A = (1 η , 0 . . . 0) + {0} × (F 2 ) nη by γ (defined as α above).
Let us see β a linear function from (F 2 ) n+1 to F 2 and define β as previously. Using the fact that β is independent from the other rows of γ, we prove that the image γ(A) is the cartesian product of the two spaces α(A) and β(A); the unconditional E⊕ -soundness will then follow.
The inclusion γ(A) ⊆ α(A) × β(A) is trivial. As β is independant from the rows of α, there exists a vector u ∈ (F 2 ) n+1 such that β(u) = 1 and α(u) = 0. Let x, y ∈ A.
We prove that there exists z ∈ A such that γ(z) = ( α(x), β(y)). Indeed, take z = x + ( β(y) − β(x)) · u. We have that α(z) = α(x) and β(z) = β(y).
F ≈ E -soundness for the theory of ciphers and lists
Before detailing the proofs of Section 5.2, notice that each well-sorted term has a unique sort (recall that variables and names have a fixed sort). As the equations themselves are well-sorted (if t : s and t = Esym t then t : s), and the indices n of function symbols are redundant with the sorts, we tend to omit the indices in terms. For instance, if k, k : Data, we write: enc(cons(k, nil), k ) instead of: enc 1 (cons 1 (k, nil), k ).
F.1 Detailed proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5. Let ϕ be a closed frame. There exists a pattern ϕ such that ϕ ≈ Esym ϕ.
The proof of Proposition 5 relies on the following Lemma 1, that is used stepwise to rewrite a frame into a pattern. As for the termination of the procedure, assume that ϕ is not a pattern; define T as the father of the largest non-deducible subterm of ϕ; it is easy to see that T is necessarily of the form We first introduce an handy lemma that gives a characterization of deducible terms. 
where the T i are deducible subterms of ϕ and C 1 , C 2 are contexts that do not contain names. We have M ϕ → * R dec(T 1 , T 2 ). Either dec(T 1 , T 2 ) is in R-normal form. In that case and by convergence of R, we have T = dec(T 1 , T 2 ), hence the result. Or dec(T 1 , T 2 ) is not in R-normal form. By convergence, we have dec(T 1 , T 2 ) → R T . Since T 1 and T 2 are already in normal form, we must have T 1 = enc(T 1 , T 2 ) and T = T 1 . Either C 1 = enc(C 1 , C 1 ) and we have T = C 1 [T 1 , . . . , T k ]. Or C 1 = , which means that T 1 is a deducible subterm of ϕ. We deduce that T is a deducible subterm of ϕ, hence the result.
We can now start the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. Since ϕ = ϕ {n → t} and E sym is stable by substitutions of names, we have eq Esym (ϕ ) ⊆ eq Esym (ϕ). To prove eq Esym (ϕ) ⊆ eq Esym (ϕ ), we introduce the following lemma. We set θ to be {n → t}. Let n 1 , . . . , n p be the names occurring in ϕ .
The lemma is proved by inspection of the rules of R. The reduction occurs at some position p: the reduction
is itself an instance of the left-hand-side of a rule of R, than we clearly have that C 1 → R C 2 such that T = C 2 [n 1 , . . . , n p ]θ, where C 2 is obtained from C 1 by replacing C 1 by C 2 et position p. If C 1 is not an instance of the left-hand-side of a rule of R and since t is already in R-normal form, there are only four possibilities for
It must be the case that n i = n, t is of the form dec(u, v) and v = C 1 [n 1 , . . . , n p ]. ¿From Lemma 2 and since ϕ Esym
are deducible. In both cases, we obtain a contradiction. Indeed, if
is a subterm of ϕ, which contradicts that ϕ is in normal form. If n i and C 1 [n 1 , . . . , n p ] are deducible then this contradicts ϕ Esym v.
This case is very similar to the previous one.
It must be the case that n i = n, t is of the form head(v) and C 1 [n 1 , . . . , n p ] = tail(v). ¿From Lemma 2 and since ϕ Esym C 1 [n 1 , . . . , n p ], either C 1 [n 1 , . . . , n p ] is subterm of ϕ or n i and C 1 [n 1 , . . . , n p ] are deducible. Like previously, in both cases, we obtain a contradic-
is a subterm of ϕ, which contradicts that ϕ is in normal form. If n i and C 1 [n 1 , . . . , n p ] are deducible then both n and tail(v) are deducible in var φ , which means that both head(v) and tail(v) are deducible in ϕ, thus v is deducible in ϕ, contradiction.
This case is very similar to the previous one. Now, let (M = N ) ∈ eq Esym (ϕ) and let us show that (M = N ) ∈ eq Esym (ϕ ). We have M ϕ = Esym N ϕ, i.e. M ϕ θ = Esym N ϕ θ. By convergence of R, we get that there exists a term T such that M ϕ θ → * R T and N ϕ θ → * R T . Applying repeatedly Lemma 3, we get that M ϕ → * R T 1 such that T = T 1 θ and N ϕ → * R T 2 such that T = T 2 θ. Assume that we have proved that T 1 = T 2 . Then we get M ϕ = Esym N ϕ , i.e. (M = N ) ∈ eq Esym (ϕ ), which concludes the proof. It remains us to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Let T 1 and T 2 two terms such that ϕ Esym
The lemma is proved by induction on the sum of the size of T 1 and T 2 .
-The base case is trivial.
-If none of T 1 or T 2 is n: T 1 = f (T 1 , . . . , T k ) and T 2 = f (T 1 , . . . , T k ). We must have T i θT i θ for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Applying the induction hypothesis, we get
-The most difficult case is when T 1 = n and T 2 = f (T 1 , . . . , T k ). We first notice that since nθ = f (T 1 , . . . , T k )θ, n can not occur in T 2 , thus T 2 = T 2 θ = t. Thanks to Lemma 2 and since ϕ Esym T 2 , either T 2 is a subterm of ϕ , which is impossible by construction of ϕ or the immediate subterms of T 2 are deducible in ϕ (thus in ϕ), which contradicts the choice of t.
F.2 A generalized SPRP assumption
In the same way as we generalize the IND-Pi-Cj assumption, we propose here a generalization of SPRP to the case of messages of heterogeneous sizes. The ω-SPRP assumption consists of the following experience G η involving an adversary A:
-draw a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}; -if b = 0, draw a key k; give A access to the encryption oracles E η,n (·, k) and decryption oracles D η,n (·, k); -if b = 1, draw a random permutation π n over {0, 1} ηn for each n; give A access to the π n and π −1 n instead of the regular encryption and decryption oracles; -after interacting with the oracles, A outputs a bit b ; A is successful in
The advantage of A is defined as
The ω-SPRP assumption holds for (E η,n , D η,n ) if the advantage (1) of any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary is a negligible function of η. It has been shown [16] that the SPRP assumption (on one given cipher) is equivalent to asking that the encryption scheme and its inverse are both IND-P2-C2 or equivalently both IND-P1-C1. We conjecture that this is still the case for strengthened version of these notions-however this falls outside the scope of this paper. Within this (probably simple) conjecture, the ≈ Esym -soundness Theorem 4 holds for any ω-SPRP encryption scheme. 
F.3 Proof of Theorem 4 (≈
We begin by stating a computational counterpart to Lemma 1. Then:
where ϕ = ϕ{T → n} is obtained by replacing every occurrence of T in ϕ by n.
Notice that the hypothesis of Lemma 5 are stronger than its formal version, Lemma 1. For instance the encryption key k is required to be atomic; the first condition on k trivially implies that k is not deducible from ϕ. Also nothing is said about head and tail symbols.
Proof (of Lemma 5).
Before proving the lemma, let us consider the example of a wellformed frame ϕ 1 = {x 1 = enc(T 1 , k), x 2 = enc(T 2 , k)}, where k does not appear in T 1 , T 2 , and T 1 = Esym T 2 . This frame is statically equivalent to ϕ 2 = {x 1 = n 1 ; x 2 = n 2 }. Our problem here is to prove that
] are actually indistinguishable. It is not hard to see that this will be the case if and only if the probability that T 1 and T 2 have the same concrete value is negligible. A consequence of this phenomenon is intuitively that we need to prove Lemma 5 and-at least-a limited form of = Esym -faithfulness at the same time. Formally, let us write |ϕ| e and |T | e for the number of distinct subterms with head symbols enc or dec, occurring resp. in a frame ϕ and a term T . Let P n and Q n be the two properties:
(P n ) Lemma 5 holds provided that |ϕ| e ≤ n.
(Q n ) For all R-normal terms T 1 , T 2 of the same sort such that: T 1 , T 2 have only atomic keys, the frame ϕ = {x = T 1 , y = T 2 } has no encryption cycles, T 1 = T 2 and |ϕ| e ≤ n, the probability P e 1 , e 2 ← [[T 1 , T 2 ]] Aη ; e 1 = e 2 is negligible.
We prove P n and Q n by mutual induction on n, that is, more precisely we prove the four statements: (1) P 0 , (2) P n+1 ⇐ Q n , (3) Q 0 , (4) Q n+1 ⇐ (P n+1 and Q n ).
(1) P 0 is trivially true. 
f (T 1 , . . . , T n ) = f Aη ( T 1 , . . . , T n ) if f (T 1 , . . . , T n ) ∈ {enc(T , k), dec(T , k)} where we have written E n (.) and D n (.) for the encryption and decryption oracles of the ω-IND-P1-C1 game, and E * ( U , a 0 ) for the challenge ciphertext, obtained after submitting the two plaintexts U and a 0 (this is done only once, just after U has been computed); 4. submit the concrete frame {x 1 = T 1 , . . . , x n = T n } to A and return the same answer.
Note that since T 0 is not a subterm of an encryption or decryption with k, B is indeed a 1-stage attacker. The distribution computed by B and submitted to A equals either that of a 0 (in the latter case E * ( U , a 0 ) = E n0 ( a 0 ) is simply a random number). Thus the probability that B guesses the right answer is the same as A. Now it may happen that B does not meet the second requirement for winning the ω-IND-P1-C1 game, that is: (i) there exists a subterm enc n0 (T, k) such that T = U and T ∈ { U , a 0 } or (ii) there exists a subterm dec n0 (T, k) such that T = E * ( U , a 0 ).
For (i), the probability that T = a 0 is negligible by construction. Moreover, as T and T 0 = enc n0 (U, k) are two subterms of ϕ and T 0 is not a subterm of T , the frame ϕ = {x = T, y = U } has no encryption cycles and |ϕ | e < |ϕ| e = n + 1. The induction hypothesis Q n implies that the probability for T = U is negligible.
As for (ii), if the challenge ciphertext E * ( U , a 0 ) is the encryption of its second argument, that is E n0 ( a 0 ), then the probability for T = E * ( U , a 0 ) is negligible; otherwise E * ( U , a 0 ) = E n0 ( U ). Recall that T 0 = enc n0 (U, k) is in normal form, thus U = dec n0 (T, k). As T 0 and dec n0 (T, k) are two subterms of ϕ and T 0 is not a subterm of dec n0 (T, k), the frame ϕ = {x = U, y = dec n0 (T, k)} has no encryption cycles and |ϕ | e < |ϕ| e = n + 1, hence the induction hypothesis Q n implies that the probability for T = E n0 ( U ) is negligible.
iii. compute T 2 recursively as follows:
f (V 1 , . . . , V n ) = f Aη ( V 1 , . . . , V n ) if f (V 1 , . . . , V n ) ∈ {enc(T , k), dec(T , k)} enc n0 (U, k) = E * ( U , a 0 ) (same notations as before) iv. if E n0 ( U , T 2 ) = T 2 , returns 0, otherwise return 1. Clearly A guesses the correct answer with non-negligible probability. As before, we use the property Q n to conclude that its advantage is non-negligible. 2. Suppose T 1 = π i1 (enc(u 1 , k 1 )) and T 2 = π i2 (enc(u 2 , k 2 )) (the 3 other cases with decryption symbols are similar). As ϕ has no encryption cycle, we can assume for instance that k 1 < ϕ k 2 . By P n+1 , we have (
] Aη ) where ϕ = ϕ{enc(u 1 , k 1 ) → a} = {x = T 1 , y = T 2 } for some fresh name a. We then apply Q n to T 1 and T 2 .
Proof (of Lemma 6) . Point (i) is easily shown by induction on i, using the five last equations of E sym . For (ii), notice that: Therefore the soundness criterion holds for well-formed R-normalized frames and we conclude by Theorem 1.
Notice that the use of the ideal semantics could not be (easily) avoided as two statically equivalent patterns may not be equal modulo renaming of bound names.
Proof (of Lemma 7)
. We prove the property by induction on the number m of encryption and decryption by non-deducible keys in ϕ.
If m = 0, by the well-formedness condition, ϕ is already a pattern. Suppose that m > 0. As ϕ has no encryption cycle, we choose a non-deducible (atomic) key k appearing in ϕ, such that k is maximal for the encryption relation > ϕ .
As k is not deducible, is maximal for > ϕ and ϕ contains no head and tail symbols, the only occurrences of k in ϕ are as encryption or decryption keys. Let T be the largest subterm of ϕ of the form T = enc(U, k) or T = dec(U, k). We apply Lemma 5 on ϕ and T and conclude by induction hypothesis on the obtained frame ϕ .
